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 A common compatibilist view says that we are free and morally responsible in virtue of the 
ability to respond aptly to reasons. Many hold a version of this view despite disagreement 
about whether free will requires the ability to do otherwise. The canonical version of these 
views is reductive. It reduces the pertinent ability to a set of modal properties that are more 
obviously compatible with determinism, like dispositions. I argue that this and any reductive 
view of abilities faces a significant challenge: it cannot adequately explain the freedom-
grounding element of this ability. The problem has the form of a dilemma. This leaves reasons-
responsive compatibilists with two options: abandon theories of free will grounded in abilities 




There is a popular inspirational quote shared on the internet that articulates a powerful and 
intuitive thought about the nature of free agents: “between stimulus and response there is space. 
In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our 
freedom”.2  It is this actionable “space” between what happens to us and what we do that makes 
us morally responsible beings. 
This spatial metaphor is, of course, just a metaphor. But it gestures at an important 
conceptual point about the nature of free agency. Free agents have an ability to choose (or decide) 
what to do. In virtue of this ability, free agents settle for themselves what they are going to do.  
Put otherwise, free agents make a difference to what happens by exercising their ability to choose. 
This difference-making is unlike the happenings that result from the activity of non-agents in the 
world, for whom what happens next is, in comparison, just a reaction to what came before.  
I will argue that this basic conceptual point about the kind of ability that characterizes free 
agents is the source of a serious problem for compatibilists, one to which we have been 
insufficiently attentive. I will proceed with a widespread view in mind as an example. The view 
 
1  (Acknowledgments) 
2 The quote is often misattributed to Viktor Frankl. See: https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/02/18/response/. 
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holds that we are free and morally responsible in virtue of the ability to respond aptly to reasons. 
Call the view reasons-responsive compatibilism.  Many hold a version of this view, in spite of 
disagreements about whether or not free will requires the ability to do otherwise.3  
The canonical version of such views is reductive. Abilities are reduced to modal properties 
that are more obviously compatible with determinism, like dispositions (e.g. Fischer and Ravizza 
(1998)). I argue that this reductive view faces a significant challenge: it cannot adequately explain 
the freedom-grounding element of abilities.  
The literature seems to have a sense of this problem for the reductive view insofar as there 
are specific criticisms of specific versions of it. For instance, (Watson 2004: 67) worries that actual 
sequence views in the style of Fischer and Ravizza (1994) try to understand abilities in terms of 
“counterincentive”. And Clarke (2009, 2015) and Whittle (2010) have each argued that the “new 
dispositionalists” who favor a reductive account of the ability-to-do-otherwise in terms of 
dispositions, like Fara (2008) and Vihvelin (2013), fail for both extensional and conceptual reasons. 
Yet no one has articulated the general problem for reductive compatibilism by abstracting away from 
the actual sequence versus alternative possibilities debate. The problem is that by reducing the 
pertinent abilities to dispositions, we lose out on an important conceptual constraint in offering a 
theory of free will: that we explain how free agents make a difference to what happens by exercising 
their ability to choose (or try, or decide) what to do.  
 I raise the general problem in the form of a dilemma. This problem seems to extend to 
any reductive compatibilist view, regardless of the proposed reductive base. In fact, the problem 
is a general metaphysical problem with reductionism about free will in terms of abilities, 
 
3 Wolf (1990), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Nelkin (2011), McKenna (2013), Vargas (2013), and Vihvelin (2013), among 
others, each defend some version of this view despite disagreement about whether free will requires the ability to do 
otherwise. Sartorio (2016) is a kind of reasons-responsive theorist, but her view does not turn on abilities. “Reasons-
responsive compatibilism” usually picks out views in the style of Fischer and Ravizza (1998). I use the term more 
broadly. I would include Susan Wolf (1990) and Dana Nelkin (2011) in this camp, who defend what is sometimes 
called the “Reason view”. Kadri Vihvelin’s (2013) view is often labeled a form of “dispositional compatibilism”, since 
her view involves the disposition to choose on the basis of reasons. All of these views understand free will is to be 
had in the ability to respond aptly to reasons, in spite of disagreement about, for instance, whether moral responsibility 
requires the ability to do otherwise. 
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irrespective of the truth of determinism. Yet whereas libertarians have not explicitly endorsed the 
kind of reductionism at issue, this problem badly impacts extent compatibilist views, because the 
reduction is an important part of the standard case for compatibilism.4  My focus, then, will be on 
compatibilist views. 
The dilemma leaves reasons-responsive compatibilists, and compatibilists in general, with 
two options: abandon theories grounded in abilities (e.g., Sartorio 2016) or abandon reductive 
theories of abilities (e.g., Wolf 1990, Nelkin 2011, McKenna 2019).   
2. Abilities, Dispositions, and the Gap Problem 
 
A traditional way of construing the problem of free will and determinism begins with the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility.  One of these necessary conditions is having a 
certain kind and degree of control over one’s actions.5 Call the kind and degree of control sufficient 
for meeting this condition on moral responsibility free will. A common assumption among the 
majority of disputants in the free will debate is that the control condition is to be understood in 
terms of abilities. So, to say that there is some free will ability is to say that there is an ability, or 
collection of abilities, such that when had by an agent, that agent meets the control condition of 
moral responsibility. Then arguments are marshalled as to whether some candidate free will ability 
is compatible with determinism, the thesis that the past and the laws of nature entail one unique 
future.6  
 
4 It is possible that some event-causal libertarian views of free will have implicit commitments to the kind of 
reductionism at issue in this paper. (Agent-causal libertarians do not endorse reductionism, so they can be set aside). 
But there are tricky interpretive issues here. I will discuss these complications at length in footnotes 27 and 29. My 
view is that a further discussion is needed about how event-causal libertarians treat the ontological status of abilities, 
one that falls outside the scope of this paper. The general problem for reductionism about abilities is most clearly 
articulable, and most important for the ongoing debate about free will, in the context of contemporary accounts of 
reasons-responsive compatibilism. 
5 It is generally accepted that there is at least one other condition on moral responsibility besides a metaphysical or 
control condition: a knowledge condition. It is an open question whether not the conditions for moral responsibility 
are exhausted by these two conditions. I discuss the problem in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
sake of clarity in presenting the problems. Less strictly, what we are after is a theory or explanation of what moral 
responsibility requires.  I should also note that although it is not uncontroversial to frame the problem in terms of 
moral responsibility, it is also not universally accepted. For some likeminded philosophers, see: Pereboom (2001: xxii), 
Mele (2006: 17), and McKenna (2008: 187). 
6 More formally, determinism is the thesis that two propositions, one describing the past at some given time, and 
another describing the laws of nature, together entail a proposition describing the one unique future. 
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How might a compatibilist proceed? They need to offer (1) an intuitively candidate free 
will ability, which is (2) compatible with determinism. Consider a classic view. Philosophers like 
Ayer (1954), Schlick (1939), and Moore (1912) attempted to reduce abilities to sets of 
counterfactual conditionals, e.g., of the form: “If I had tried to do otherwise, then I would have 
done otherwise”. 
 These counterfactuals were meant to reveal and reductively explain freedom-relevant 
capacities of the agent. Compare: in a deterministic world there is no obvious threat to the 
counterfactual claim that if I were to drop salt into water, it would dissolve. This counterfactual 
claim tells us something important about the nature of salt, namely, that it has the disposition to 
dissolve in water. Likewise, counterfactuals about what some agent would have done if they had 
tried to do differently reveals something important about our nature as agents: So, we move from 
abilities to determinism-friendly counterfactuals, identifying the free will ability as an ability to do 
otherwise. This is a clever tactic. But this sort of account fails by extensional inadequacy (e.g. 
Lehrer 1968). Imagine an agent who is so afraid of the color red that they would never try (or want 
or decide) to eat a piece of red candy. But say that this agent is otherwise psychologically normal. 
If so, it seems true that if they had tried to eat the red candy, then they would have. So, the classical 
analysis renders the false verdict that agents are able to do what they cannot do in light of 
psychological incapability (in this case, eat red candy). 
How might one keep the cleverness of this strategy, without falling prey to its extensional 
failure? Instead of focusing on counterfactuals, we could focus on dispositions as a reductive base 
for abilities. What is a disposition? Let’s consider an example. Fragility is the disposition of some 
object to break (and so manifest fragility) when put into certain kinds of situations, like being 
dropped. In other words, dispositions manifest under specifiable stimulus conditions (cf. Martin 1994, 
Lewis 1997, Manley and Wasserman 2007, inter alia). Dispositions are presumptively compatible 
with determinism. We can see why by thinking about the close relationship between dispositions 
and counterfactuals. In a deterministic world there is no obvious threat to the counterfactual claim 
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that if I were to drop salt into water, it would dissolve. And this is true of salt which never comes 
into contact with water. So, salt’s solubility is not threatened by determinism. If one were to offer 
a reductive analysis of the free will ability in terms of dispositions, one could secure the ability’s 
compatibility with determinism.  
This is the strategy that many reasons-responsive compatibilists take. For the sake of 
argument let’s assume that the ability that gives us control sufficient for moral responsibility is the 
ability to respond aptly to reasons (where this ability involves being able to respond to a relatively 
high degree of such reasons).7 In other words, the free will ability is reasons-responsiveness. Here 
is an apparently promising way, it seems, to secure the compatibility of free will and determinism: 
reduce the reasons-responsive ability to the dispositions necessary and sufficient for having that 
ability. They are presumptively compatible with determinism. And if the ability is identified with 
these dispositions, then the agent’s ability is not mysterious in the least. Her ability to respond 
aptly to reasons is just her being disposed to respond aptly to reasons. We can moreover learn about 
the nature of her rational dispositions by imaginatively checking what reasons she would take as 
sufficient in counterfactual situations. Fischer and Ravizza, for instance, appear to take up this 
strategy.8 First, they analyze reasons-responsiveness as dispositions to recognize and react to 
sufficient reasons and follow through by explaining these dispositions in terms of a collection of 
true counterfactuals (1998: ch. 3, sections IV.2 and IV.3). This provides an explanatorily fleshed 
out view of what the ability to respond to reasons is, how we can know about it, and why it is 
compatible with determinism. 
A recent instance of this reductive strategy (disregarding areas of disagreement with 
Fischer and Ravizza) is found in Vihvelin (2013). She argues that our narrow abilities, abilities in 
the sense of those things we can do but could remain unexercised, “are structurally like the so-
 
7 I’ll omit this qualification in the discussion to follow. 
8 McKenna (2019: 23, ft. 15) claims that Fischer and Ravizza never commit to a reductive view. Nevertheless, I believe 
it is the most promising interpretation of their view, since, if it succeeds, it secures the compatibility claim. McKenna’s 
alternative suggestion for them does not. I’ll discuss this kind of alternative in section 6. Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for raising this issue. 
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called intrinsic dispositions of medium-sized objects—dispositions like fragility, elasticity, 
solubility, and so on” (2013: 169). How so? They are both three-place relations: fragile glass has a 
disposition to break when dropped, and I have the ability to speak French given the opportunity. 
She goes on to say that “our narrow abilities”, what in us makes us able to do things without 
considering our opportunities, “are either intrinsic dispositions or bundles of intrinsic 
dispositions” (2014: 169). And she goes on to argue that the abilities relevant to free will are wide 
abilities to respond to reasons. Wide abilities involve not only narrow abilities but also 
opportunities to exercise them. Opportunities on this view are understood as situations amenable 
to the manifestation of our dispositions. And since dispositions are compatible with determinism, 
we have a compelling compatibilist account of abilities.9 This reductive approach may go some 
ways towards explaining, as Vargas (2013: 139, ft. 6) put it, the “uncontested consensus about the 
possibility of reasons sensitivity even under determinism.” 
Despite the cleverness of this strategy, some incompatibilists have been skeptical about 
the sense of ability to be gleaned from this kind of reductive project (e.g. Van Inwagen (1983), inter 
alia). The source of this skepticism stems from a simple point: dispositions do not seem to be the 
same thing as abilities. Here is Peter van Inwagen’s archetypal way of making the distinction 
between dispositions (causal powers and capacities) and abilities (agentive powers):  
For a man to have the capacity to understand French is for him to be such that if 
he were placed in certain circumstances, which wouldn’t be hard to delimit, and 
if he were to hear French spoken, then, willy-nilly, he would understand what was 
being said. But if a man can speak French, it certainly does not follow that there 
are any circumstances in which he would, willy-nilly, speak French. The concept 
of a causal power or capacity would seem to be the concept of an invariable 
disposition to react to certain determinate changes in the environment in certain 
determinate ways, whereas the concept of an agent’s power to act would seem 
not to be the concept of a power that is dispositional or reactive, but rather, the 
concept of a power to originate changes in the environment. (1983: 10-11) 
 
 
9 To be clear, Vihvelin argues that free will and determinism are compatible prior to her endorsing this dispositional 
view of abilities by attacking incompatibilist arguments. That our abilities are explicable as bundles of dispositions is 
meant to explain why the ability to respond aptly to reasons is compatible with determinism. More forthcoming in 
section 6. 
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In other words, abilities involve something more than the mere reactivity displayed by 
dispositions.10 But what is this something more?  
Well, the sense of “can” involved in the statement “the fragile vase can break when 
dropped” involves no power of the vase to instigate novel changes, unlike a typical “can” claim 
involving an agent’s ability. Instead, the vase’s fragility involves a reaction to the condition of it 
striking a hard surface. One could think of capacities, skills, and talents in a likewise manner. For 
instance, one cannot help understanding spoken French, if one is fluent in the language. I myself 
am disposed to become angry when someone insults me, disposed to laugh at a good joke, and 
disposed to sweat when I run. Dispositions like these, whether had by objects or persons, involve 
stimulus conditions and manifestations of inner natures. A stimulus condition is a set of circumstances 
that primes a reaction. And to manifest something is to perhaps express and make apparent some 
inward nature.  
There are of course similarities between dispositions, but there are also important 
differences. A disposition can be interfered with (finked or masked) such that it will not manifest 
in its stimulus condition.11 For example, a fragile glass will not break when wrapped in bubble 
wrap. Abilities can be masked and finked too, a fact that some dispositional compatibilists have 
focused on (Fara 2008; Smith 1997, 2003). But this makes sense if we think that abilities and 
dispositions are both species of the same modal genus, like powers or potentials (Vetter 2013: 8).  
Yet the other ways we think about abilities do not overlap so nicely with dispositions. In contrast, 
one is able to perform some action if one is put together the right way so as to have the power to 
do said action and one has the opportunity to exercise that ability. An opportunity is a set of 
circumstances that makes an action possible. Opportunities are not mechanism triggers. They are 
seized upon or missed. One elects if and when to speak. When I speak French, I do more than 
 
10 Two points. First, van Inwagen means “willy-nilly” in the sense of happening like it or not, rather than happening 
haphazardly. I’ll use it in this sense too. Second, ordinary talk of abilities is quite permissive. We can say perfectly well 
of my car that it is able to handle rough terrain in virtue of its four-wheel drive and suspension. The abilities at issue 
in this discussion are the sort at issue in the free will debate, which are relevant to human agency.   
11 For examples, see Martin (1994) and Lewis (1997). 
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manifest or express my inward knowledge of its grammar and vocabulary in certain circumstances. 
I do more than manifest the necessary features of myself relevant to speaking French. I have 
control over these elements. I direct them and govern their expression such that I have, in the 
relevant sense, the ability to speak the language. I myself settle the question of what I will say. 
Despite similarity, then, there seems to be an important intuitive difference between dispositions 
and abilities. 
We need to be precise in developing this difference. Notice that Van Inwagen talks about 
“invariable dispositions” in his criticism of the compatibilist view. This is a mistake at best and is 
question-begging at worst. We will need to consider a more sophisticated metaphysics of 
dispositions. 
Many dispositions are multi-track, best characterized by many pairs of stimulus and 
manifestation conditions. Many dispositions are had by their bearers to a greater or lesser degree 
(Manley and Wasserman 2007). The dispositions under discussion are all plausibly multi-track, 
gradable dispositions. Indeed, some dispositions have only one stimulus condition and many 
manifestations, and conversely, some dispositions have many stimulus conditions and a single 
manifestation. For example, there are lots of ways to break the fragile glass: dropping, throwing, 
clumsily handling, being hit with precisely 5 newtons of force, and so on. Likewise, there are lots 
of ways for that the fragile glass to break. It can crack this way or that way or even shatter 
completely. And perhaps the fragile glass is less fragile than the nice china, which seem to break 
when I simply look at it. Given this, I would disagree with van Inwagen that dispositions manifest 
willy-nilly because they are “invariable”. They are willy-nilly insofar as it is not up to the bearer of 
the disposition that the disposition manifests. 
Perhaps Van Inwagen thinks that all dispositions are what Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
(1982: 251) call “surefire” dispositions. Surefire dispositions are such that their intrinsic properties 
and relevant stimulus conditions, understood as the relevant set of antecedent circumstances, are 
a causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestations of the disposition. This is indeed 
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question-begging, because not all dispositions are surefire.12 Consider the radioactive atom that 
has an indeterministic disposition to decay or not decay. Or consider the outgoing partygoer’s 
chancy disposition; they will probably be very outgoing at the party, but they may not (McKitrick 
2009: 190). Perhaps there are even what Hájek (2020) has recently dubbed “minkish dispositions”, 
dispositions who might (rather than would) chancily fail to manifest in their stimulus conditions. 
Consider the wine glass that has a disposition to break when struck but might not break when struck 
on account of a merely chancy spot of structural strength.  
Nevertheless, indeterministic, probabilistic, and minkish dispositions are still not the same 
things as abilities. The atom simply decays or not. The minkish wine glass will not break if it is 
struck on the chancy strong spot that just so happens to be strong when it is struck. And even if 
the normally outgoing agent just is not feeling the party, they can overcome their feelings. It’s just 
they are not up for the party on this occasion, and this is not something that is up to them.  So, 
even when dispositions are not surefire, I still want to say that the disposition manifested willy-
nilly. 
So, dispositions—be they simple, multitrack, surefire, or chancy—seem distinct from the 
kinds of abilities we are concerned with when theorize about free will. We can highlight this 
distinction by thinking about what dispositions and abilities do. Dispositions and abilities can both 
make a difference to what happens. However, there is apparently an important dissimilarity in the 
way that each can make a difference (cf. Nozick 1981: 311-313). Dispositions can make a 
difference insofar as some outcome would have been different if the disposition had not 
manifested. They can also make a difference insofar as their non-existence, absence, or their being 
interfered with would not bring about the same outcomes.13 But abilities can do more than 
 
12 One might be tempted to define indeterministic dispositions as those dispositions whose manifestation may but 
needn’t occur given the presence of the stimulus condition and the absence of intervening factors (cf. Clarke 2009: 
326, ft. 3). But as an anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, these dispositions could occur in deterministic worlds. 
Nothing in my argument that there is a gap between dispositions and abilities hangs on how we should precisely 
understand the nature of indeterministic dispositions.  
13 Sartorio (2005) argues that causation involves this kind of difference making. 
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contribute to a change in outcomes given circumstances; instead, abilities are the origin of such 
changes. What settles that the fragile glass will break is not the glass itself—it is simply a matter of 
placing the glass in a condition in which its fragility manifests.  Likewise, even with the minkish 
wine glass. In the right conditions, it simply might break. By contrast, by exercising an ability of 
the sort free will consists in, the agent settles what she will do. It is not merely a matter of the 
conditions she finds herself in. (Hence the apt spatial metaphor from the introduction). Agentive 
abilities, then, make a difference in this settling-specific way.14  
In other words, there is a conceptual gap between our concept of dispositions on the one 
hand and our concept of agentive abilities on the other. The intuitively freedom-grounding aspect 
of these abilities—that they are the medium by which free agents settle what they well do— seems 
missing from dispositions. So, this aspect of these abilities seems unexplainable by dispositions as 
a suggested reductive base. Call this the gap problem. One need not endorse any strong conceptual 
constraints on successful reduction in order to advance the gap problem. It’s just that dispositions 
seem either wrong as an analysis of abilities altogether, or deeply ill-suited to explain them.15 One 
might think that the gap problem poses a serious problem for any reductive analysis of the free 
 
14 Some, like Mele (2017), demand clarity about how one settles what they do in the context of the disappearing agent 
objection to event-causal libertarianism. Say that I am deciding on what flavor of ice cream to buy. Following 
McKenna and Pereboom (2016: 238), I say that you settle which flavor-buying decision—deciding to get butter pecan 
instead of chocolate—by settling on butter pecan. A candidate view of the free will ability is an elucidation of how an 
agent goes about settling. For instance, to say that free will consists in the reasons-responsive ability is to say that an 
agent settles what she is going to do insofar as she is able to recognize and reacting to a suitable range of reasons. Settling, 
then, is the prior notion, one that could plausibly be basic in giving a theory of free will. Obviously not everyone will 
agree with this characterization. As I say below, the difference between dispositions and the kinds of abilities at issue 
in the free will debate to turn on an intuitive desideratum on a theory of free will, that it explain how a free agent has 
the control to settle what they are going to do. The problem then is best understood as a burden shift driven by, as a 
matter of methodology in metaphysics, taking this intuitive desideratum seriously. 
15 Clarke (2009: 338-339, 2015: 901) and Vetter (2019) each point to a similar problem. Clarke suggests that having 
many kinds of abilities, and in particular the ones at issue in the free will debate, cannot simply be a matter of having 
a disposition (or bundle of dispositions). Abilities involve both underlying competencies (plausibly construed as 
dispositions) but also something more. When it comes to the abilities at issue in the free will debate, perhaps this 
something more is the choice to exercise them. So, dispositions are necessary but not sufficient for having the sort of 
abilities at issue. Vetter argues that dispositionalists “fail to classify a range of important exercises as exercises of 
abilities” (2019: 07). Drawing examples from Steward (2012), she points to sub-intentional actions, like scratchings, 
and complex habits, like riding a bicycle, as instances of action that do not depend on the kinds of basic actions that 
tend to feature in dispositional analyses of abilities, like tryings (or decidings or choosings). The gap problem is a 
distinct worry from either Clarke or Vetter’s, but it explains why Clarke and Vetter are each right. Abilities make a 
difference in a way that dispositions do not. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me in the direction of 
Vetter’s paper. 
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will ability. So, it poses a problem for reductive accounts of the free will ability as the ability to 
respond aptly to reasons in terms of dispositions. I will develop this problem in the form of a 
dilemma in the next section. 
3. The Dilemma  
I suspect that some compatibilists will not be moved by the gap problem as stated. Reductive 
compatibilism reduces abilities to dispositions by invoking what I will call active dispositions as the 
reductive base: dispositions that involve the activity of the agent. By contrast, we could think of 
fragility as a mere or passive disposition, a disposition whose elements are not agent-involving in this 
way.  Reasons-responsive compatibilists typically reduce the ability to respond aptly to reasons to 
these kinds of active dispositions. Consider the plausible idea that van Inwagen’s French-speaking 
agent does so because she has a disposition to choose to speak French. (Or a disposition to choose 
whether to speak at all, or any number of agent-involving dispositions). One might think that, 
surely, an agent settles that they speak French by way of such dispositions! Thus, the reductive 
view has not failed to explain anything about the kinds of abilities that constitute free will.16 
I’ll argue that this will not suffice. What is it to be disposed to choose to speak French, or 
to be disposed to speak French when one tries to? Let’s characterize the reductive view of the free 
will ability as the view that all there is to having agentive abilities is to have active dispositions (of 
a particular sort). But agentive activity cannot feature in either the stimulus conditions or the 
manifestation of a disposition without losing the intuitively freedom-grounding element of 
abilities. What do I mean by “agentive activity”? Well, we could think about an agent’s activity in 
terms of her exercising her abilities as either the stimulus or manifestation of a disposition, e.g., to 
exercise an ability to choose. We could instead think of an agent’s activity simply in terms of the 
performance of an action, .e.g. ,to make a choice. An agent’s action could be either the stimulus 
or manifestation of a disposition (or both).  No option—neither activity as manifestation, either 
 
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry, and pushing me to clarify these points about how an agent’s 
activity can feature in the reductive dispositional analysis of abilities. 
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as the exercise of an ability or as the performance of an action, nor activity as stimulus, either as 
the exercise of an ability or as the performance of an action—will work for the reductive 
compatibilist. Reducing abilities to dispositions to act runs afoul of the gap problem, whereas 
reducing abilities to dispositions to perform abilities does not secure the kind of reduction that 
would show how the free will ability is compatible with determinism, robbing the compatibilist of 
the motivation to go in for a reductive view in the first place. 
Let’s consider the first horn. One could offer an analysis of the free will ability in terms of 
dispositions where an agent’s action is the manifestation of the disposition; for example, you could 
be disposed to choose on the basis of the reasons you recognize. But if so, then you do not settle 
what reasons you recognize, having no control over the antecedent stimulus conditions. Perhaps 
thinking of actions as manifestation is still not active enough. Consider again the plausible idea that 
an exercise of an ability itself could be the manifestation of a disposition. Problematically, however, 
this renders a purported analysis of the pertinent ability non-reductive. We cannot say that the 
kinds of abilities we wish to reductively explain are a part of our proposed reductive base. So, this 
kind of view does not secure what was compelling about the classical compatibilist strategy. 
Without a reduction, it is not clear that the ability invoked is compatible with determinism.  
Now let’s consider the other horn. One could offer an analysis where an agent’s action is 
the stimulus conditions of the disposition; for example, you could be disposed to respond aptly to 
reason when you try to. Perhaps trying here is just the product of a prior disposition to try, and if so, 
then it looks like the agent does not settle for herself that she tries.  If instead the prior trying is 
the exercise of an ability to try, then once again our analysis is not going to be reductive.17  
So, neither option adequately captures what is freedom-grounding about the pertinent 
abilities, that they are that in virtue of which an agent settles what they are going to do, while 
remaining a reductive view of abilities of the sort a compatibilist wants.  
 
17 One could plausibly read Michael Smith’s (1997, 2000) and Michael Fara’s (2008) views in this way.  
 13 
This dilemma undermines the compatibilist motivation for reductionism about abilities, 
namely, to offer a theory of how the free will ability could be compatible with determinism. I claim 
that this is because the pertinent agentive abilities, the ones in virtue of which an agent is free and 
so morally responsible, make a difference in a special way. I have characterized this special way 
terms of making a difference by settling. As a conceptual point, one can see how talk of settling 
might give rise to the thought that if determinism is true then no agent can ever make a difference 
in the settling-specific way. (Perhaps this question-begging thought lurks in van Inwagen’s 
remarks). For all I’ve said, one might worry on behalf of reductive compatibilism that I am 
appealing to incompatibilist intuitions unfairly and so starting with a notion of control that is much 
stronger than compatibilists should accept (even if it does not entail the falsity of compatibilism) 
by casting the control needed to be morally responsible in terms of settling.  
I will explore issues in greater detail in section 6, where I will show how a possible 
libertarian view would also face the gap problem and compare the gap problem to the disappearing 
agent objection to event-causal libertarianism. For now, note that this objection presupposes too 
much about the pertinent notion of settling. I take it that the pertinent notion leaves open the 
compatibility question. Having an ability does not necessarily mean one has a power to originate 
changes by settling on what to do in a way that simply requires that there are no antecedent 
sufficient conditions for whether or how one originates those changes. It’s just that when an agent 
exercises her free will ability, she makes a differing by settling that such a change occurs, given the 
opportunity to do so.  
How then should we understand the argumentative force of the gap problem, and the 
dilemma I am pushing against reductive compatibilists? I will invoke the idea of a neutral inquirer 
here, like many do in the free will debate, as a way of establishing argumentative burdens (e.g. Mele 
2006, Pereboom 2008, McKenna 2014).18 The thought that there is some space between what 
 
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpfully suggesting this way of framing the gap problem. 
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happens to us and what we do, the idea that free agents settle that such-and-such occurs, should 
strike a fair-minded neutral inquirer as an important and intuitive desideratum of a theory of the 
free will ability. I do not think such a neutral inquirer would count the failure to capture this 
desideratum as an outright defeater of a theory. Maybe the theoretical gains made by the theory 
outweigh the cost of failing the intuitive desideratum. Nevertheless, I want to give voice to the gap 
problem as a problem precisely because the apparent theoretical benefits of reductive compatibilism 
have obscured an important cost. The gap problem casts doubt on the idea that the pertinent 
abilities are nothing more than active dispositions, and so the view that free will is nothing more 
than reasons-responsive dispositions to act. As this reductive commitment is a central feature of 
the common reasons-responsive view, it is worth expressing this important cost. 
In the immediate next sections, I will illustrate the different horns of the dilemma using 
two example views, one on each horn of the dilemma: Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) appeal to 
response-responsiveness and Kadri Vihvelin’s (2013) dispositional conception of free will.  
4. Agentive Activity as Manifestation 
 
Consider the first way of proceeding, where one attempts to analyze the free will ability in terms 
of dispositions where the activity of the agent is the manifestation of the disposition. For instance, 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 62) seem to offer this kind of view. They work in terms of dispositions 
to recognize reasons and to choose in accordance with those reasons.19 This sort of view seems to 
animate the presumptive case in favor of reasons-responsive compatibilism, for these dispositions 
seem to capture agentive activity and are apparently compatible with determinism. One might be 
tempted to say that a view like this just shows that there is no gap problem at all. The view says 
there is no gap. There is nothing leftover or left out when we reduce.  
Although at first it might seem that the gap problem disappears on such an account, I 
 
19 They talk in terms of a “cognitive” power to recognize reasons and an “executive” power to choose. Both are 
general dispositions of an agent’s mechanism of action rather than abilities of the agent. This executive power is 
explicitly cast in terms of reacting to incentives recognized by the cognitive power (1998: 75). The successful 
manifestation of the cognitive disposition is the stimulus for the executive one. 
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worry that this just buries the issue. Dispositions manifest when the stimulus condition occurs, 
willy-nilly. This seems to be conceptually ill-suited to explain abilities insofar as the stimulus 
conditions prompt the manifestation of the disposition. The problem is that dispositions seem 
unable to highlight a sense of control moving through the processes of stimulus condition to 
manifestation. Consider dispositions to recognize reasons and choose in accordance with those 
reasons. First, we do not settle what reasons we recognize as such. And given this, our choices 
seem not to be settled by us either—that is, unless we have an ability to choose in response to our 
reasons. Notice that if this further ability is reduced to a further disposition to react to reasons, 
then we once again fall into the gap problem, rendering our reaction to reasons as something that 
we ourselves do not settle. 
Isn’t this a stretch? It might seem to some that the gap problem boils down to the idea 
that the stimulus conditions of a disposition are something done to the thing which has said 
disposition (like dropping a fragile glass). Dispositions seem to involve a kind of passivity on the 
part of the disposed. Actions, on the other hand, originate from the agent. If one thought that this 
was the heart of the gap problem, one might reply like this. It is important that the agent’s reasons 
are the stimulus conditions for my choosing. Why? They are internal to the agent (cf. Clarke 2015: 
898, Vihvelin 2013: 172). It is not as if something outside of the agent is pushing her around! This 
makes an active disposition to respond to reasons rather unlike a disposition like fragility. Indeed, 
these active dispositions seem to be tracking an internal locus of control on the part of the agent. 
 Fair enough. The gap problem is neither about the external conditions of action nor about 
the agent’s lack of activity, however. The problem as I understand it is about explaining the right 
kind of activity, the sort difference-making which characterizes the freedom-grounding aspect of 
abilities. The free will ability is typically understood to be an ability to perform a basic action, an 
action we can take without doing something else. These are typically understood to be abilities to 
choose, decide, or try. Hence, we can be directly in control of and responsible for the performance 
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of basic actions like choosing, deciding, or trying.20  But which reasons I recognize is not a matter 
of my taking a basic action by deciding, choosing, or trying. (At least not directly). So, nothing 
about the stimulus condition of my dispositions to choose in response to the reasons I recognize 
is a matter of my taking a basic action. And if my choosing in accordance with the reasons I 
recognize is the (willy-nilly) manifestation of a disposition, then it looks like I do not settle the 
matter of what I do. An agent’s reacting to the reasons which she recognizes cannot be a mere 
reaction to background conditions.21 
 To close the gap, we need the right sort of activity to feature in the pertinent dispositions. 
Otherwise, they will be mere dispositions. Plausibly, though, the right kind of activity, the kind of 
activity that would ground an agent’s freedom, is just the exercise of an ability in response to her 
reasons, like an ability to choose. Exercises of abilities do not happen willy-nilly. They do not 
happen irrespective of an agent’s performing a basic action.22 So now it looks like we will have to 
invoke the exercise of an ability as the manifestation of the disposition to respond to reasons. If 
so, then these dispositions cannot be a suitable reduction base for the pertinent abilities. They 
involve abilities! Indeed, if we have said nothing about the nature of these abilities to choose, then 
perhaps they require the falsity of determinism. If so, then we cannot marshal this kind of reductive 
analysis as part of the case in favor of compatibilism. 
5. Agentive Activity as Stimulus 
 
Reductive reasons-responsive compatibilists will have to try something different. Let’s consider 
the other kind of account that a reasons-responsive compatibilist might offer, which reduces 
abilities to active dispositions where the pertinent activity is in the stimulus condition of the 
disposition.   
 
20 For instance, Pereboom (2001: xxi) suggests that freedom and responsibility apply to decisions. 
21 Switching to an agent-based reasons-responsive theory (e.g. McKenna 2013) won’t resolve this problem. If we 
characterize the agent’s reasons-responsiveness in terms of dispositions, then we seem committed to her (willy-nilly) 
responding to a condition which was not settled by herself. 
22 An initial gloss of “irrespective of the agent” might read “whether the agent likes it or not”, but as a referee helpfully 
pointed out, perhaps the pertinent manifestation of the disposition involves doing as one likes! The more apt 
comparison is again to an ordinary disposition like fragility. The fragile glass will simply break when dropped. 
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I will use Vihvelin’s (2013) view as an example. Vihvelin sees herself as offering an account 
of active dispositions to act in intelligent and goal-directed ways. Indeed, she distinguishes between 
the pertinent active dispositions and mere dispositions like fragility, solubility, and the like (2013: 
178). She maintains that the free will ability is the narrow ability to choose on the basis of reasons. 
Extrapolating from her analysis of abilities as dispositions, this narrow ability consists in being 
disposed to choose on the basis of reasons. These choices need occur only in a suitable proportion 
of cases where one has an opportunity to choose on the basis of reasons, has some intrinsic causal 
basis for this ability, and tries to choose on the basis of reasons (2013: 187). This seems to capture 
the right kind of activity. Why? The “tries to choose” condition of the analysis here is important. 
For it allows the agent to settle the stimulus condition of the disposition to respond aptly to 
reasons. This gets around the problem for views that only locate the relevant agentive activity in 
the manifestation condition.  
You will notice that this is a sophisticated version of the failed classical compatibilist 
conditional analysis of abilities cast in terms of dispositions rather than counterfactuals. Recall that 
such views were extensionally inadequate and so couldn’t motivate compatibilism. Vihvelin rightly 
has a more modest aim in mind. Her dispositional account is meant to “fill in the details” of a 
compatibilist conception of what abilities ground the facts of freedom within a commonsensical 
picture of free agency (2013: 214).23 Dispositions are supposed to explain why the free will ability 
is compatible with determinism not show that it is so.24  
Still, if the modest aim of offering a compatibilist-friendly analysis of abilities fails by way 
of the gap problem, a fortiori so too does the less modest aim of employing such an analysis as part 
of the case for compatibilism.  
 
23 Vihvelin does not offer an analysis in the sense of giving necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, she thinks of 
herself as offering an analysis vis-à-vis plausible ontological reduction as a kind of research program for compatibilists 
(2013: 170). 
24 In spite of my criticism, I am sympathetic to Vihvelin’s defense of commonsense, compatibilism. She rightly claims 
that the issue of determinism is orthogonal to what ordinary people mean when they say that they have abilities and 
opportunities. I only worry about her treating abilities like dispositions. 
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This modern, modest take on the classic strategy won’t work, unfortunately. It faces the 
same difficulties as its forerunner. It turns out that these difficulties are in fact explained by the 
gap problem.  
Chisholm (1964) articulated the following challenge to the classical conditional analysis. 
The classical analysis is supposed to tell me whether or not I could do otherwise. It says I can do 
otherwise when, if I had tried to do otherwise, I would have. But a trying to do otherwise is just 
an instance of doing otherwise, because a trying is itself a doing. It is a particular kind of doing, a 
mental action, and a basic action at that. Trying is plausibly an action we can take without doing 
something else. Hence, it is the sort of thing we can have direct control over and be directly 
responsible for. The ability to try is therefore, plausibly, an ability to perform a basic action. This 
is the sort of ability which might be the free will ability. And I may or may not be able to try. To 
parrot Davidson’s (1973: 114) understanding of the argument: the antecedent of the pertinent 
conditional must not contain any verb which makes sense of the question: can someone do it?  
In order for the analysis to be informative, then, it must assume that I am able to try. That 
I am able to try is exactly the kind of question we ought to be answering in the free will debate, 
and unfortunately, it has gone unexplained. Indeed, the counterexamples to the classical analysis 
are just cases where an agent cannot try to do something, but nevertheless, if she were to try to do 
it, she would (e.g. Lehrer 1968). Thus, the agents in the counterexamples appear unable to perform 
the action in question.  
In other words: the classical analysis appeared informative only because it assumed that an 
agent could perform a basic action, a trying or the like. There are, after all, many actions we can 
take only because we try. However, the classical analysis offers no answer to the question: is the 
agent able to try? The analysis therefore does not rule out that indeterminism is part of what it 
takes to be able to try. It is simply silent on the matter.  
The same challenge faces dispositional accounts of abilities that involve basic actions in 
the stimulus condition. Recall that (simplifying a good deal) Vihvelin’s analysis reduces the ability 
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to respond aptly to reasons to a disposition to respond aptly to reasons when one tries to choose 
on the basis of reasons. Analyses of the free will ability are supposed to tell us what it means when 
we say I am able to try to do things. They cannot presuppose that I am able to try in order to be 
informative. And it looks like Vihvelin’s take on the classical strategy does so. It doesn’t tell us 
what it means for an agent to be able to try to choose.  In her case, the problem is also related to 
a purported extensional failure. Clarke (2015: 896) has suggested that Vihvelin’s analysis fails by 
counterexample in cases where the intrinsic causal basis of an ability will be lost were the agent to 
try to exercise it.  
Perhaps these objections are mistaken. The agent in the counterexamples cannot try to do 
the target action. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which she is able to perform the action. Why? 
If she were to try to, she would succeed, just as this kind of reductive analysis suggests (cf. Vihvelin 
(2013: 201-203).   
I remain unconvinced. Reflecting on the gap problem clarifies that the sense in which the 
agent in the counterexamples remains able to do things is not the pertinent sense. The reductive 
analyses leave open the possibility that the exercise of some of an agent’s abilities (that is, that they 
are exercised) could fail to be settled by the agent herself. This is just a failure to explain the aspect 
of agentive abilities that seem to ground an agent’s freedom and responsibility. To exercise this 
sort of ability is to make a difference by settling that some action occurs given the opportunity to 
do so.  
In general, a proponent of this sort of analysis—the sort where we take agentive activity 
to the stimulus condition of the disposition to act—has two options when it comes to performing 
basic actions like trying. Let’s construe a trying as the acquisition of an intention or desire to do 
something that is causally efficacious in beginning the process of doing something goal oriented 
(Vihvelin 2013: 176).25 Well, either the agent settles that she acquires a causally efficacious intention 
 
25 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, trying often involves performing complex bodily actions, and it seems like 
the simple fact of acquiring an intention or forming a desire is not sufficient for trying. Vihvelin’s way around this 
problem, which strikes me as the plausible strategy, is to count as tryings causally effective initiators of complex 
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or desire, or she doesn’t. 26 In the first case, the proponent of the analysis cannot invoke an 
unexplained ability to try (or choose, or decide) to try, in virtue of which the agent settles that she 
tries. And if the proponent explains this ability to try to try as a disposition to try when one tries 
to, then we can simply reiterate the problem. When is an agent able to try to try? On the other 
hand, if the proponent instead argues that a trying can initiate from a process which the agent 
herself does not settle, then I say this process is not control-implicating. The trying isn’t settled by 
the agent herself. (An agent doesn’t settle that she tries when a trying is caused by an overwhelming 
and unendorsed desire, for instance).   
We should conclude that this kind of analysis cannot plausibly explain what the pertinent 
reasons-responsive abilities are. Given this, they cannot offer a plausible compatibilist view of how 
free will could be compatible with determinism.  
6. Two Objections Considered and a Note on a Family Resemblance 
 
So far, I have argued that reductive analyses of the free will ability in terms of dispositions face an 
intuitive gap between the reducing entity and the reduced one, using reasons-responsive abilities 
as an example. One way to deal with this gap makes it such that an agent’s actions are not settled 
by the agent herself. The other way presupposes that agents have abilities of the sort which are 
plausible candidates themselves for free will. These analyses therefore fail. Since they fail, they 
cannot be put to work in favor of compatibilism. (They could, however, feature as partial 
characterizations of the free will ability in a compatibilist view. More on this shortly). 
Skeptical readers will still have been worrying that the gap problem begs the question 
against compatibilism, and after setting out the argument and working through two examples, I 
can now answer their skepticism. Vihvelin herself gives voice to this worry in a particularly clear 
 
sequences of goal-oriented action. Basic actions that count as tryings will likely involve one’s reasons for action, like 
the weighing of one’s reasons. But now we have to ask if this weighing is the exercise of an ability or the manifestation 
of a disposition, and hence, we run into exactly the sort of explanatory issue the gap problem raises for a view like 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998), as discussed in section 4. 
26 Vihvelin offers a defense of both options. She can consistently do so because she holds the view that a process 
counts as a trying if it causally leads to the beginning of an action. Such a process may or may not be initiated by an 
agent’s trying to try (2013: 176-180). 
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way. She suggests that van Inwagen appears committed to the claim that “the concept of a 
disposition is the concept of something that is compatible with determinism whereas the concept 
of an agent’s ability or power to act is the concept of something that is incompatible with 
determinism” when he distinguishes abilities from dispositions (2014: 173). If this were so, then 
van Inwagen plainly begs the question. Perhaps I do too.  
I don’t, though. I have defended no principle which entails the falsity of compatibilism. 
Indeed, I have argued that the gap problem extends to dispositions that are indeterministic or 
chancy. Perhaps it looked like I begged the question since an upshot of my view is that an adequate 
account of the free will ability looks more friendly to libertarians than compatibilists have generally 
recognized, since libertarians have less reason to adopt reductionism about abilities. They do not 
have the reason to reduce for the sake of explaining how free will could be compatible with 
determinism. Nevertheless, there are possible libertarian reductive accounts of the free will ability 
in terms of indeterministic dispositions. And the gap problem is in principle generalizable to these 
views. Since there are to my knowledge no libertarian accounts of free will of this sort, what I hope 
to show by sketching a possible libertarian view is that the gap problem does not beg the question 
against compatibilists.27  
 
27Although I know of no libertarians who offer explicitly reductive accounts of the free will ability in terms of 
indeterministic or chancy dispositions, it is generally assumed that you can get an event-causal libertarian view by 
taking an event-causal compatibilist view and inserting indeterminism into the causal chain at the right moment. And 
the reductive, reasons-responsive compatibilist views we have been considering are indeed event-causal.  This suggests 
that it is possible that some extant libertarian accounts of free will also are caught up in the gap problem in terms of 
dispositions, and the dilemma it poses. Here’s how. Randolph Clarke (2000: 21, 22) characterizes a modest event-
causal libertarian view as one that starts from the assumption that agents have “an ordinary capacity to engage in 
practical reasoning”, and who agrees with the compatibilist “that agent’s having and being able to exercise a capacity 
for rational-self-governance” but insists that some causation in the causal process that leads to action must not be 
deterministic. What are these capacities? Perhaps they are dispositions. Perhaps it is plausible, then, to think that the 
gap problem extends to event-causal libertarian views that unreflectively assume the standard reductive compatibilist 
commitments I believe fail due to the gap problem, and the dilemma that ensues from it.  Are there unreflective event-
causal libertarians? I am doubtful. My sense is that contemporary event-causal libertarians will either not offer full 
reductive analyses of the free will ability, like Franklin (2018), who offers a partial analysis of abilities, or simply not 
appeal to abilities in offering their views, perhaps like Ekstrom (2019)—see footnote 34. As a historical note about 
the origins of the gap problem, it is worth pointing out that van Inwagen himself nearly takes the notion of human 
ability as a fundamental when he rejects classic dispositional accounts of abilities (1983: 9-10).  This makes sense.  If 
you thought that the important freedom-grounding element of free will was indeterminism, you would not worry so 
much about appealing to (and then reducing) abilities to something that was compatible with determinism, like 
dispositions. However, like Dana Nelkin (2012: 75), I think that a focus on indeterminism mislocates what is special 
about free will.  
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To briefly recap the gap problem in terms of indeterministic dispositions: there is a 
difference between the radioactive atom that has an indeterministic disposition to decay or not 
decay, and the ability of an agent to speak French or not. For there is surely no sense of control 
on the part of the atom in whether or not it will decay, whereas one elects if and when to speak. 
And this is because the stimulus condition of the atom’s decay does not provide an opportunity. 
The stimulus could trigger a reaction, or it could not. Conversely, if an agent exercises her ability 
to speak French, she had an opportunity to do so. Moreover, she settles that she speaks. If you are 
a libertarian, you may think she settles this because nothing antecedently determined her to do so.  
Can our libertarian close this gap between indeterministic dispositions and abilities? No. 
Here again we have the dilemma. Let’s say that she offers a simple view like this: the free will 
ability is the indeterministic disposition to choose in response to reasons. The problem here is that 
she does not settle the reasons she recognizes. And her choice cannot be a mere reaction to her 
reasons. A reaction is still a reaction, even when it is not determined to happen given prior 
conditions. If she does settle her choice in response to reasons, then, it seems to be because she 
exercised some ability.  
What if the libertarian says instead that the free will ability is the indeterministic disposition 
to choose when one tries on the basis of reasons? Now we have run into the other problem. Aren’t 
we trying to explain abilities to perform basic actions like trying? We can’t presuppose an 
unexplained ability to try.  
In brief: the gap problem does not beg the question against the compatibilist. It is a general 
problem about reductionism in the metaphysics of abilities. So, the gap problem is legitimate and 
poses a serious problem for reductive accounts of the reasons-responsive ability (and of the free 
will ability in general).  
But maybe the gap problem begs the question against reductionism about free will. Well, none 
of the foregoing entails that other reductive compatibilist projects, ones that are not based around 
dispositions, will fail. What might these alternatives look like?  
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They mustn’t look very much like the kind of reductive compatibilism I’ve considered 
above. The gap problem seems to remain even when we change the underlying metaphysics from 
disposition to something else. As an example, consider a reductive compatibilist project based on 
causation and not on dispositions. One way to secure the compatibility of some agency-relevant 
ability and determinism is to reduce that ability to patterns of causation. Alfred Mele’s compatibilist 
proposals could be construed in this manner. In his (1995: 193), free action critically involves the 
nondeviant production of action on the basis of rationally formed deliberative judgment. “On the 
basis of” seems not uncharitably construed as a causal notion. (In any event, one might neatly 
adapt his proposals in this manner).28   
The worry for the reductive strategy in terms of dispositions is that it failed to account for 
the freedom-grounding element in our concept of a free agent’s ability. There is a “space” between 
what happens to us and what we choose to do within which agents can make a difference by 
settling what comes next. Now, if our abilities are to be successfully reduced to causal relations, 
then I fear we will once again lose the freedom-grounding element in our concept. There is no 
“space” between causes and effects. Causes are not opportunities for effects; effects are not 
elected.  
A compelling way to get around this new gap would be to reduce abilities to patterns of 
causation, and then (perhaps) reduce causation to pertinent counterfactuals (cf. Lewis (1973). But 
now we face a dilemma. A plausible way of developing this idea would be to put the agent’s activity 
in either the causes or the effects. If in the effects, then it is no longer clear that it is the agent who 
settles what she is going to do. If instead the activity is in the causes, then just like putting activity 
in the stimulus condition of a disposition, we risk presupposing what we aim to explain or failing 
to explain it altogether. The second horn of this dilemma essentially echoes Chisholm’s (1964) 
 
28 See Mele (2006: 170) for another example. 
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criticism of the classical compatibilist view. If we say an ability involves an agent’s trying or 
deciding as a cause of action, well, what causes the agent to try or decide? 
The problem on the other horn, of putting activity in the effects, is old too. Davidson 
(1973) suggested a way around Chisholm’s problem for the classical compatibilist view: move the 
action verb to the consequent of the conditional and place plausible causal conditions of 
intentional actions into the antecedent. Davidson (ibid.: 148) suggests this: “A can do x 
intentionally (under the description d) means that if A has desires and beliefs that rationalize x 
(under d), then A does x.”   
But Davidson finds this causal fix problematic in a way that echoes the problem on the 
first horn of the dilemma (1973: 154-155). Deviant causal chains prevent us from saying that if an 
agent’s desires and beliefs rationalize x then he does x intentionally. An agent’s beliefs and desires 
may directly cause the rationalized action. Davidson’s example is a climber who, in order to 
survive, needs to let go of a rope holding up a fellow climber. She is so unnerved by this thought 
that she slips up and drops the rope without meaning to. The analysis wrongly says that she acted 
intentionally Now, There is a compelling tradition of thinking about deviant causal chains in action 
theory that says our intentions (or other relevant psychological states) guide unfolding action in a 
way that resolves the deviance problem (e.g., Brand 1984, Mele and Moser 1994). Davidson is 
concerned with action, whereas I am concerned with free (and do so morally responsible) action. 
But notice that the agent herself does not settle that she is in fact unnerved, and that a simple 
Davidson-style reductive analysis of the free will ability in purely causal terms would wrongly 
suggest that she intentionally acted, and so settled that fact. I suspect that a more complex appeal 
to guidance will not avoid this basic problem (although much more could be said about this). 
Readers conversant in debates concerning libertarianism might now notice some 
similarities between the gap problem and the disappearing agent objection to event-causal 
libertarianism (Pereboom 2014; Levy 2008, 2011; Waller, 2011). As Pereboom (2014: 60-61) puts 
his version of disappearing agent objection, if there is no antecedent agent-involving event that 
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determines which course of action the agent will take, the agent does not really settle what they 
are going to do, and so the agent “disappears” from the very explanation of how the agent is free. 
Pereboom goes so far as to say that on the event-causal libertarian theory, nothing settles that a 
decision to act occurs. Is this just the gap problem for libertarians? 29 
 No. The gap problem is similar in form to this objection, but they are distinct.30 They have 
ancestral feature, namely an appeal to the intuitive idea that a free agent settles for herself what 
she is going to do.  But each develops this appeal in different ways. The event-causal libertarian 
suggests that an agent is free in virtue of a non-determined event-causal process, and the objector 
suggests that agents cannot settle what they do in virtue of such a casual process without 
disappearing, so to speak. The gap problem is related to but distinct from the disappearing agent 
objection, insofar as the gap problem concerns reductive explanations of free will in terms of abilities. 
The views under consideration in this paper suggest that agents have free will in virtue of abilities, 
understood reductively in terms of dispositions (or causal sequences), and my objection is that 
agents cannot settle what they do in virtue of these things. The problem is not that the agent 
disappears from the pertinent explanation of free will—the reductive compatibilist view under 
discussion focuses on what I have called “active dispositions”, which involve the activity of the 
agent.  
 
29 Here again we might consider how actual libertarian views interact with the gap problem. Mele (2006, inter alia) is a 
well-known agnostic about the free will problem, advancing both compatibilist and libertarian theories of free agency. 
Perhaps the libertarian version of his view will face the gap problem. But in general, it is harder to say exactly what 
libertarians should think about reducing abilities to causal sequences. Let me explain with a recent example. Laura 
Ekstrom (2019: 141) seems to endorse a kind of reductionism about abilities when she says that “events—the 
occurrence of certain of an agent’s attitudes, which are considerations relevant to the decision—cause the event of 
the decision; that is what it is for an agent to exercise her ability to make a decision for reasons.” But in saying so, she 
is responding to the disappearing agent objection as Pereboom advances it, and so it seems charitable to think she is 
downplaying the explanatory role of abilities rather than adopting the strong version of reductionism about abilities 
that I am targeting in this paper. This would suggest that many event-causal libertarians have a somewhat analogous 
view to that of Carolina Sartorio (2016), whose I describe as advancing an “ability-neutral” view in the next section. 
30 My sincere thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Disappearing agent objections are related to a 
more general worry with event-causalism as a reductive theory of agency. On an event-causal framework, where events 
are fundamental rather than agents, one might worry that there seems to be no agent settling anything at all, but rather, 
only agent-involving events (Velleman 1992, Mele 2003, Steward 2012). One way to persuasively respond to this 
problem is, like Mele (2003), to characterize it in terms of “shrinking” agency and show how an event-causal account 
can explicate agency par excellence, agency that has all the features we want it to. I am inclined to think that part of 
agency par excellence is apt description of agency in terms of abilities and believe that these descriptions are consistent 
with both agent-causal and event-causal frameworks. 
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Notice too that if the disappearing agent objection succeeds, the option left for the 
libertarian theorist of free will seems to be agent-causalism. By contrast, the gap problem is neutral 
with respect to the ontology of agents. It has implications for the ontology of abilities, nevertheless, 
which I will explore in the next section. Indeed, one way to mark the difference between the two 
objections is to note that an event-causal libertarian can appeal to an agent’s abilities to secure an 
appropriate agent-inclusive explanation. In responding to Pereboom’s objection, as Christopher 
Franklin, a reductive event-causal libertarian, persuasively does (2018: 178). Franklin suggests that 
it is because of an agent’s abilities and opportunities that they settle what decision they will make 
that given antecedent events. And this is a very natural move to make: it is, intuitively, in virtue of 
certain kinds of abilities that an agent has free will because it is in virtue of those abilities that an 
agent settles the decisions they are going to make. So, we have an agent-involving explanation 
because the agent has abilities. Importantly, Franklin can make this move because he does not 
endorse a reductive analysis of abilities, but only advances a partial analysis consistent with his 
event-causal framework (2018: 67-69). (I will suggest that compatibilists adopt a similar line about 
abilities momentarily in response to the gap problem).  
7. Two Options Explored 
 
The foregoing objections and the comparison to the disappearing agent objection highlights the 
lesson of the gap problem. The problem with the compatibilist accounts of free will under 
consideration is not reductionism per se, but rather reductionism about the abilities in virtue of 
which we have free will.  In this section, I will suggest that compatibilist adopt one of two strategies 
instead of the commonplace reduction of abilities to dispositions.  
Here is one  promising alternative. A commitment to abilities could be given up consistent 
with a kind of reductionism about free will (and with a reasons-responsive approach to freedom). 
Carolina Sartorio (2016) argues that the freedom of an agent is grounded in the reasons, and 
crucially the absence of other reasons, given a suitably wide range of reasons, that are the causes 
of her action in the actual sequence of events. She goes on to argue that there is “no difference in 
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freedom without a difference in the relevant elements of the causal sequence” (2016: 32). Notice 
that there has been no mention of abilities so far. Her view can be developed in an ability-neutral 
way. Maybe the relevant abilities supervene on the actual sequence, but they would not be 
explanatorily basic.  Freedom is instead explained directly in terms of causation by reasons. It is 
arguable that supervenience suffices for reduction, and so such a view retains a commitment to 
the reductive compatibilist project.  
This is promising, but I have reservations. For those of us who would like to respond to 
the traditional problem of free will, the problem of reconciling some special freedom-grounding 
ability with the thesis of physical determinism, this may be asking too much. A successful account 
of freedom does seem at least a little beholden to the traditional (and intuitive) view, that if we are 
free and responsible, it is in virtue of some special ability characteristic of free agents. I take the 
rejection of this set up to be a cost to the view. Of course, though, the theoretical power of 
Sartorio’s proposal follows by denying precisely what I take to be the intuitive grounding claim. 
And many will find Sartorio’s suggestion intuitive, as it builds on longstanding ways of 
understanding the nature of action in terms of causes. Compatibilists should consider the ability-
neutral alternative carefully.  
What about those of us who think abilities need to play a critical explanatory role? There 
is another option worth considering. Susan Wolf (1990) rejects the need for a reductive analysis 
of abilities. She instead supplies a “characterization of what is involved in attributing an ability to 
someone” in terms of the skills, talents, and so on necessary for having it. Such a characterization 
purports to show the “per se irrelevance” of determinism to an agent’s having abilities (1990: 101). 
Nelkin (2013) and McKenna (2019) have both recently argued for similar views of the reasons-
responsive ability. On this kind of view, the free will ability is not identified with dispositions. 
Instead, the relevant dispositions (and related counterfactuals) provide forensic evidence about the 
existence and nature of the ability. Critically, this evidence is taken to show that the ability is 
compatible with determinism. How so? This evidence helps us understand when and why an agent 
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is able or unable to act in particular situations. For instance, if a disposition required to exercise 
some ability is impeded in some manner, we can infer that they are unable to exercise that ability. 
Arguably, these dispositions are not impeded by determinism. So, we have reason to think the 
abilities are not impeded either. This sort of view, then, does not offer a complete theory of the 
pertinent abilities, but rather, a partial and compatibilist-friendly characterization of them. I note 
that Nelkin is an agent-causalist and McKenna is an event-causalist; this non-reductive approach 
is consistent with both ontologies of agency.  
By my lights, this approach is to be preferred over the abilities-neutral alternative. The 
strategy, however, is at best, a burden shift. Even though the dispositions needed to exercise our 
freedom-relevant abilities are indeed a kind of forensic evidence about those abilities, this evidence 
does not resolve the relevant question. We have no evidence that dispositions (or skills or talents 
and so on) needed to have an ability exhaustively capture the essential freedom grounding elements 
of that ability. It is quite possible that some further element needed for having and exercising that 
ability is not compatible with determinism. Since the view offers no evidence to the contrary, it 
offers no full answer to the compatibility question. Of course, having no full answer is not the 
same as having no answer at all. Compatibilists should consider this ontologically “liberal” 
approach to abilities carefully too (McKenna 2019: 23).  
8. Conclusion 
 
Reductive compatibilism faces a serious challenge. There is a gap between our intuitive ideas about 
abilities and the metaphysical notions, compatible with determinism, that we might appeal to in 
reductively explaining the nature of these abilities. The lesson was this: compatibilists can either 
keep a commitment to reductionism about free will or keep a commitment to the grounding claim 
about freedom in terms of abilities. They cannot keep both. This problem has not been sufficiently 
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